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INSURANCE
I. LICENSING
In Taylor v. Montgomery,' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that an applicant for a license to sell insurance was properly denied
the license on the ground of untrustworthiness. The District of Columbia
Superintendent of Insurance had rejected Taylor as not "trustworthy" in
accordance with section 35-425 of the District of Columbia Code.2 Tay-
lor's application was denied in large part because he had two previous
criminal convictions, one of which was a felony. On appeal, Taylor ar-
gued that his rejection violated due process because the standard in the
statute for "trustworthiness" was unconstitutionally vague. The court
stated that section 35-426, 3 the provision governing suspension or revoca-
tion of a license, afforded sufficient notice that a felony conviction could be
the basis for suspension or revocation of a license since a felony conviction
might demonstrate untrustworthiness. The court held that the standard of
untrustworthiness for suspension or revocation proceedings in section 35-
426 also applied when the Superintendent considered an original license
application under section 35-425. Thus, Taylor had been provided with
sufficient notice and, therefore, the statute was not void for vagueness.
Taylor also argued that his previous convictions were too remote in time
to bear a rational relationship to his present trustworthiness. He had been
convicted six years earlier for receiving stolen property and eleven years
earlier for petit larceny. The court rejected this contention. Although the
petitioner's most recent conviction had occurred six years earlier, he was
still on probation when he applied for the license. The court recognized
that a rational relationship existed between the denial of his application on
1. 413 A.2d 923 (D.C. 1980).
2. D.C.CODE § 35-425 (1973) provides that "the superintendent of insurance [must be]
reasonably satisfied that the applicant is a trustworthy person" before he may grant such
applicant a license.
3. D.C. CODE § 35-426 (1973) states in pertinent part:
The Superintendent of Insurance may suspend or revoke the license of any life
insurance general agent, agent, solicitor, or broker when and if, after investigation,
it appears to the Superintendent that. . . such person. . . has been convicted of a
felony, or has otherwise shown himself untrustworthy or incompetent to act as a
life insurance general agent, agent, solicitor, or broker.
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the ground of untrustworthiness and these convictions when used as an
element in the licensing assessment.
II. EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Little v. Barry,' held that
the employer's receipt of an employee's optional insurance election form'
was a condition precedent to the commencement of coverage. Little
brought suit to enjoin her employer from deducting over $400 from her
pay for an optional group life insurance policy that her employer said she
requested but for which she inadvertently had not been charged for almost
ten years. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
In reversing, the court of appeals distinguished between the mere comple-
tion of the insurance election by the employee and the recept of the com-
pleted form by the employer. The court noted that there was no evidence
that Little's employer had ever received the form she completed. The ap-
plicable regulations stated that the effective date of insurance coverage was
to be calculated from the date "the election is received in [the] employing
office." 6 Thus, the employee's coverage never commenced and her em-
ployer was not entitled to deduct the cost of the premiums from her pay.
III. DISABILITY-RISK COVERAGE
In Byrd v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. ,' the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion that a gunshot
wound inflicted on the insured during an assault initiated by the insured
does not constitute an "accidental" injury that would entitle the insured to
benefits under a disability insurance policy. Byrd was convicted of at-
tempted murder and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. During the con-
frontation that resulted in his arrest and conviction, Byrd fired the shotgun
at a police officer and was severely wounded by police officers' return fire.
The insurance company denied Byrd's claim for disability benefits. The
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the insurer on the ground that the
injury was not accidental. The court stated that injuries sustained by the
initiator of an armed attack could be regarded as accidental if they were
not reasonably foreseeable by the insured as a natural or probable result of
his actions. However, the trial judge ruled that injuries to a person are
4. 417 A.2d 966 (D.C. 1980) (per curiam).
5. An optional insurance election form gives an employee the option of accepting or
declining the life insurance plan provided by the employer. 5 C.F.R. § 871.202 (1980).
6. 5 C.F.R. § 871.203(a) (1980).
7. 415 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1980).
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foreseeable as the natural and probable consequence of his assault with a
deadly weapon. Thus, because the policy provided coverage only for "ac-
cidental" injuries, Byrd could not collect for his injuries.
IV. MULTIPLE COVERAGE OF RISK
In Jones v. Medox, Inc. ,8 a case of first impression, the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals decided a case in which two insurance companies
insured one person for the same risk, using allegedly incompatible cover-
age methods. The appellant's policy with Globe Insurance Company
(Globe) contained a pro rata "other insurance" clause, which provided
that Globe would be liable for its proportion of the loss when other collect-
ible insurance policies existed. Insurance Company of North America
(INA), was one of the defendants in a suit by appellant and Globe to ob-
tain a pro rata share of a settlement expense paid in full by Globe. The
INA policy contained an excess "other insurance" clause. This clause pro-
vided that INA's insurance would be excess insurance over any other valid
and collectible insurance. The court of appeals reversed the lower court
holding that, where there was a conflict between one policy with an excess
"other insurance" clause and another policy containing a pro rata "other
insurance" clause, the pro rata insurer bore primary liability up to the pol-
icy limit. Instead, it adopted the Lamb- Weston rule9 that, in the event of
conflicting "other insurance" clauses, the clauses are mutually repugnant
and must be rejected with the result that liability will be prorated among
the insurers. Although it acknowledged that the Lamb- Weston rule was
the minority approach, the court emphasized the convenience, uniformity,
and equity of applying the rule.
In dissent, Associate Judge Gallagher disagreed that the insurance
clauses were in conflict. Gallagher argued that Globe's provision contem-
plated contribution from all other valid and collectible insurance. How-
ever, since INA's clause stated that it would not pay if the claim were
covered by other valid and collectible insurance (up to the policy limit),
the INA policy was not collectible insurance as contemplated by the Globe
provision. Since Globe's policy stated that it would pay in any event, sub-
ject to pro rata contributions from other possible insurers, it should have
been liable for the full amount of the policy. INA would have been liable
for any excess. 10 Moreover, Gallagher furthermore argued that an appli-
8. 413 A.2d 1288 (D.C. 1980),
9. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Or. 110, 341 P.2d 110 (1959).
10. 413 A.2d at 1292 (dissenting opinion).
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cation of the Lamb- Weston rule would disregard contractual language
manifesting the intent of the parties to limit liability.
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